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Reviewed by Michael E. Tigar2
Few books today are forgivable. Black on the canvas, silence
on the screen, an empty white sheet of paper, are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social 'reality.' 3
Written to begin a study of human alienation and the possibility
of human love, R. D. Laing's words ring true when one surveys
what passes for jurisprudence today. One sees, for example, a
serious legalist like Lord Devlin laboring long to prove, first, that
a fictive "man on the Clapham omnibus" is a viable arbiter of
legal sexual behavior and, second, that people may be fined or
shut up in prison for publishing, writing, or making love in ways
that the omnibus passenger finds revolting.4 Devlin's theory has
been oft-examined,5 but I remain struck by its rigorous insistence
on purely structural arguments - its easy assumption of the need
for rules of law which bind us all to pretty much the same outlooks
about sex and a series of other basic human drives.
A courageous, wise, and gentle judge in Los Angeles, acquitting a defendant of draft evasion in 1972, apologized for himself
and his colleagues by recalling Chesterton's words about the
English judges: They are not cruel, they just get used to things.
This judge knew that the law's customary rigor and customary
inhumanity can be crueler than deliberate vengeance; the structure of law and legal penalties, as seen by the individuals caught
up in the system, is so profoundly alienating. As Laing has also
written: 6
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Men have .. .always been weighed down not only by their

sense of subordination to fate and chance, to ordained external
necessities or contingencies, but by a sense that their very own
thoughts and feelings, in their most intimate interstices, are the
outcome, the resultant of processes which they undergo.
Because so much jurisprudence is merely justification for
the structures and systems that alienate us from one another,
Albert Ehrenzweig's learned, passionate, and perceptive book is
welcome. Psychoanalytic Jurisprudenceis not only an historical
survey of the principal currents of legal thought since the eleventh century I and a patient effort to identify the decisive differences between common and civil law systems. To be sure, were
it only these things, it would be among the most valuable legal
texts recently written. But Ehrenzweig goes farther; he seeks
to discover what makes so much of our law uncaring and vengeful, and he outlines an idea of justice that comprehends the most
basic human sensibilities and that may serve as a basis for building legal systems which respect rather than deprecate life.
Both in his survey of jurisprudential thought and in his
"world tour" of legal systems, Ehrenzweig's scholarship and
analysis are of the highest order, and no summary can do him
justice. His treatment of the leading trends in jurisprudential
theory is itself a tour de force. He concludes, and not facilely,
that the great debate between positivist and natural law schools
turns really upon a difference in the degree of emphasis placed
upon the normative, morally obligatory character of sovereign
commands, and not upon any outright eschewal by positivists of
nonverifiable moral propositions (§§ 21-46).1 His essay on comI On the "turning point" in European civilization which coincided with the
rediscovery of the Roman texts, see generally Meynial, Roman Law, in THE
LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 363 (C. Crump & E. Jacob eds. 1926). In the same
volume, see also Vinogradoff, Customary Law, at 287, and LeBras, Canon Law,
at 321. See also T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 260-80
(2d ed. 1936); P. ViNORADOFr,

RoAr LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (i909).

' The legal writers classified as positivists are concerned mainly with the structure of violence-enforced rules. Those classified as natural law theorists emphasize
received or discovered principles of morality validating such rules. To these major
schools, one may add what Ehrenzweig terms the "non-schools" of jurisprudence
(§§ 47-58), including the essentially descriptive and classification-oriented sociological, legal realist, and dialectical theories of law.
I am unsure about Ehrenzweig's use of the term "dialectical." Used to denote

a means of describing legal systems, the word creates no difficulty. However, if
Ehrenzweig means to classify all Marxist jurisprudence as a "non-school," on the
ground that it is merely descriptive, I believe he has erred. There are many ele-

ments in Marxist thought, but at least some of them deal with the relation between law and social institutions, with the forces that create and change law,

and with the historical tendencies perceived as imminent in contemporary insti-
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parative jurisprudence seeks, while putting the development of
legal concepts in historical perspective, to demystify the continental or "civil" law for common law lawyers. As a former lawyer and judge in Austria, and a lawyer, law reformer, and professor in the United States, Ehrenzweig focuses his diverse and
prodigious learning upon this analysis. After rejecting a number
of commonly held notions, he concludes that the principal differences between the common law and civil law systems consist of
the greater role which the latter gives to legal scholarship, the
more highly developed legislative process in civil law countries
as opposed to the more self-consciously lawmaking role played
by common law judges, and the easier access to the judicial process enjoyed by those subject to European civil law systems (§§
87-112).

Despite the high order of scholarship and analysis represented by Ehrenzweig's discussion of these matters, I do venture
some criticisms the meeting of which I think would have added
weight to Ehrenzweig's concluding section-his call for a new
and humane jurisprudence which takes being human, rather than
"order," "contract," or an abstract and unitary "justice," as its
beginning. To begin with, Ehrenzweig has concentrated too
much upon Europe and America. For example, he states a feeling that Western legal thought owes a large and unacknowledged
debt to Islamic law of the ninth and tenth centuries (§ 85), but
he does not develop the point. One wishes that he had, for one
of his main themes is the crucial role played by the revival of
Roman law study in the Middle Ages under the aegis of the
Church, the new national monarchs, and the rising merchant
class. And it has been suggested elsewhere- and the bloody
course of Mediterranean commercial history verifies it-that
the revival of trade, and the modern law of property and contracts, were heavily influenced by the Moslem merchants and
their merchant and consular courts.9 By the same token, one
tutions. See Cloke, The Economic Basis of Law and State, in LAW AGAINST TH
PEOPLE 65 (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971); Tigar, Socalist Law and Legal Institutions, in
id. at 327; sources cited in LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra, at 348-50, 365-67
(bibliography on this subject). See also the classic statement in F. ENGELS, THE
ORIGIN OF THE FAmIY, PRiVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE (E. Leacock ed. 1972),
a new paperback edition with a perceptive introduction by Eleanor Leacock.
I The sources in Western European languages are not complete, but they do
exist. See, e.g., W. BEwEs, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT I-I1 (1923);
R. DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTimES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINTS § 424 (4th ed. 1971).
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wishes that Ehrenzweig had considere.d more fully than he did
(§ 84) the Cuban and Chinese legal materials, particularly the
latter. The current Chinese legal system, rooted in traditional
concepts of mediation and conciliation, as well as in the Marxist
ideal of a society without a state power apparatus, casts light
upon any search for legal principles based on human needs,
drives, and desires, and for a legal system in which rules and
rule-enforcement do not appear to men and women as hostile,
uncontrollable, and therefore alienating.1"
Greater attention to materials from outside the West might
have led also to consideration and highlighting of the social
groups which have produced the jurisprudence of modern Europe
and America - the merchants, traders, and others whose stake
in sovereign power was to protect the rights of property and
contract. These groups sought to create legal theories to justify
lawmaking and law-enforcing controlled by the owners of property rather than by feudal secular or religious authorities. Thus,
in appr6aching jurisprudential writing in the West from the perspective of a need for humane systems of law, I would not concede even as much of a distinction as Ehrenzweig does between
natural law and positivist jurisprudence, or between the common
law and civil law systems. The decisive fact is that, working
for a class with fairly uniform interests and drawing upon a
common stock of legal ideas, jurisprudes were, in the building
time of Western law, a group of specially trained persons whose
job it was to justify structures of power. These structures were
independent from, and alienating to, the subjects of such power.
The jurisprudes constructed intellectual models which made
"logical" to rulers and (so far as possible) to their subjects the
means by which violence was to be done against people in the
name of "their" church, lord, king, corporate city government,
or, in the case of republics, their collective selves. Though there
are exceptions, they are few. Even during and after revolutions,
jurisprudence, as the task of this specially trained group, was
not related expressly or implicitly to human needs, except by the
conceit that the needs of those who paid for jurisprudence to be
written coincided with the needs of humanity in general. To
expand on this point requires an historical outline.
recent works in Western languages deal with this subject, and
Ehrenzweig does cite some of them (§ 84). However, it would be useful to attempt
to integrate these legal sources with such material on social institutions in China
as W. HINToN, FANsHEN (i966); V. NEE & D. LAYMAN, Tic CuLTuPAL REVoOF THE RiVER
LUTION AT PEKING UNIVERSrrY (1969); E. SNOW, THE OTHEF. SI
(1962) (republished in 1970 in paperback under the title RED CHINA TODAY with
10Several

additional material).
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While the Roman Church's desire to replace the universal
authority of the Roman Empire greatly encouraged the rediscovery and renewed application of Roman law, the real revival of
jurisprudence in the West after the eleventh century took place
under rather different sponsorship and with quite different motives. The rising merchant class welcomed, of course, any authority which could both guarantee the security of trade against
feudal warfare and relieve the trader from the feudal impediments to traffic in goods. These impediments took the form both
of feudal seigneurial regulations of status and property rights,
and of feudal particularistic tolls, taxes, and restrictions on the
movement of goods.
The revival of trade and the beginnings of money economies
were accompanied by the establishment of the communes of
artisans and merchants. These "new cities," "free cities," franchised cities, burghs, and boroughs were created either by revolutionary uprisings of artisans and merchants, or by feudal
seigneurial grants (clerical, royal, or otherwise) made to promote
and organize commerce or to populate frontier areas for defense
and trade purposes. Though the cities existed formally within
the feudal system, they prefigured the dissolution of the personal
bonds which held that system together and the replacement of
those bonds by those of contract and property relations.
In the cities took root the revived commercial jurisprudence
of Rome, regarded as the authoritative basis of new social relations, or as "natural law and written reason." Even in the North
of France, where customary law was said -to reign, the custumnals
of the cities owed evident debt to the Roman-based law of merchants. In Germany, despite the continuing vitality of customary
institutions as exemplified in the Sacksenspiegel (Mirror of the
Saxons), the same was true. And in the South of France and
Italy, Roman law was officially recognized as the primary source
of legal rules.
The struggle to dissolve feudal bonds spread outward from
these cities which were centers of sedition even against the feudal
lords who had more or less grudgingly recognized the rights of
the bourgeois, the burghers, and the burgesses to control trade.
One by one, the governments of Europe were swept away by this
new force - their erstwhile ally - and the vestiges of feudalism
were abolished. The troops who did the fighting in these revolutionary struggles were often poor artisans, journeymen, and
peasants, but the directing force was always those who stood the
most to gain from the thorough triumph of private property.
And one can see that the legal system which crowned each such
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successful conquest of power consolidated authority in the hands
of those who had the most money and property to protect."
In the course of these struggles between the eleventh and
nineteenth centuries, jurisprudential writing was a major undertaking of each organized group which either hoped to gain power
or wanted to consolidate power it already had. One cannot separate the great legal treatises, ordinances, charters, and custumnals of these nine centuries from the men and women of power
who paid for them. Lawyers and jurisprudes were for hire and
worked in the courts of lords and sovereigns, and in the universities established and patronized by the Church or the Crown.
Jurisprudence was not an activity for the commonalty; indeed,
the Church for a time forbade the lower orders from reading the
old legal texts. Jurisprudence was an instrument of actual or
potential power, and each writing bears the indelible stamp of its
patron's interests. One need not search far, therefore, to explain
the estrangement of our Western legal heritage from more human
concerns.
To be sure, there were occasional revolts and returns, looking
back to the time when laws and legal institutions were not so
forbidding. "Justice," some seditious souls believed, should be
defined in terms of human needs and of community, rather than
in terms of what sorts of violence it might properly wreak rather than in the terms, for example, of the French coutumes,
defining "high justice" as the right of him who possessed it to
punish grave crimes and to have a scaffold.'" Some, perhaps,
thought of Paul, who counselled resort to pastors or brothers for
resolution of disputes. There were late echoes of this ideal, as
in the sixteenth century German saying "Juristen, b6se Christen"
(jurists, bad Christians) ,'13 or in the occasional attempts to escape reliance upon formal structures of law in communes and
cities.
While this short summary has spoken principally of continental European developments, it should be recognized that the
decisive features of the English law of contracts and property
(at least property in movables) were determined by the same
historical forces. Legal history as taught in law schools pays far
too much attention to feudal and royal law in England and too
little attention to the law merchant's spreading power and influ- See P. KROPOTxiN, TnE GREAT FRENCu REVOLUTION: 1789-1793 (1909)
(reissued in a 1971 Schocken paperback).
'2 See 2 C. BOURDOT DE RICHEBOURG, NOUVEAU COUTUmIER GENERAL 415 (nouvele ed. 1724); C. FERRIERE, i DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT ET DE PRATIQUE 671
ed. 1749); 2 id. 9513

See R. DAVID, supra note 9, at § 27.

(3d
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ence. This influence was achieved through merchant courts, fair
courts (Courts of Pie Powder), admiralty courts, borough courts,
and through the outright borrowing by dozens of English cities
of the custumnals of continental cities.
I do not set out this sketch to combat in any sense Ehrenzweig's own far more detailed one. Indeed, the above discussion
takes as its beginning and owes a great debt to the sensitive,
encyclopedic, and cogent presentation in Ehrenzweig's work of
the main outlines of legal philosophy and history. More importantly, the points made above largely comport with and support
Ehrenzweig's central message, to which I now turn.
The second half of Ehrenzweig's book is an attempt to go
beyond the structures of legal rules and principles to the human
motivations forming their foundation. For Ehrenzweig, psychoanalytic knowledge has three functions in relation to jurisprudential study. First, it enables us to see the motives behind
fierce debate in the fields of law and social science. Second, the
insights of Freudian psychoanalysis into conflict and cooperation
within the father-dominated monogamistic family provide clues
to the origin and maintenance of specific forms of social organization which have been crystallized and ossified into laws and
rules. Third, he believes that the potential for human understanding and human liberation in the work of Freud and some
post-Freudians provides keys to an essential reformation of
criminal law, torts, and other fields of law in light of knowledge
about human needs.
His views on the last subject are especially valuable and
timely. To suggest a jurisprudence founded upon human drives
and needs is an important step. To bring to such a suggestion a
wealth of analysis of psychoanalytic writing, social science, and
jurisprudence is a great service.
The criminal law is but one illustration, though the most dramatic because of the stakes involved, of the overlay of unreason
and superstitution in Western law. In the area of criminal responsibility, for example, the varying doctrines of "insanity" and
"diminished capacity" have led to a confusing array of legal
rules, each little more supportable than the M'Naghten "right or
wrong" test 14 and all sophistically turned into a largely irrational
and result-oriented jurisprudence. Even in the present state of
Western society, jurisprudential theory should be able to recognize some basic patterns of violent conduct for which punishment
is mere vengeance and deterrence an empty hope. Ehrenzweig
14 MINaghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (House of Lords 1843)

as inability to distinguish right from wrong).

(defining insanity
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suggests, to begin, a distinction between oedipal and postoedipal
crimes. The former are those which originate in family-based
patterns of aggression: "the oedipal period of parricidal wishes"
(§ i8o at 211). The depth and strength of urges to commit such
crimes preclude deterrence. In contrast, postoedipal crimes are
those which, like theft, "respond to desires whose repression occurs at a postoedipal stage" (§ i8o at 212).
While making notes for this review, my eye fell upon a story
in the local newspaper which illustrates the oedipal crime, admittedly with unusual sharpness. A 14-year-old boy observed
his father, half-drunk, beating the boy's mother, as was the
father's wont when intoxicated. The boy took a rifle and shot
his father, who then lay down on the parental bed, gravely
wounded. The boy went outside, and through the bedroom window shot his father eight more times, killing him. When the
police arrived, the lad said, "He always beat my mother, I could
take it no longer. Take me to prison." 15 Any jurisprudence that
treats such an act as meriting imprisonment, even if only in
theory, is irrational, and overlooks much that we have so painfully learned about primal urges of protection and love, hatred
and aggression.
At the root of Ehrenzweig's programmatic suggestions is his
insistence that the search for overriding and absolute postulates
about justice is doomed to fail. For, he points out, the sense of
justice is not unitary, but formed of complementary and competing principles originating in different archetypical family situations, and pressing toward different behavior in individual
humans and toward different results in solving concrete problems
of adjudication. Ehrenzweig's insistence upon eclectic, and often
dialectic, competing "justnesses" does not, however, take the form
of multiplying the variables or grounds of decision so as either
to make all choice irrational or to deny causality. He seeks rather
to understand why, from what basic motives, lawyers, judges,
and litigants elevate certain principles over others in the search
for "justice," or in the justification of results obtained or sought
in the system which calls itself "justice."
This attempt to penetrate structures of rules and principles
to the human motivations underlying them is valuable, as is
Ehrenzweig's closely reasoned critique of Western law in the
light of psychoanalytic theory. I believe his analysis to be incomplete, however, for reasons which do not depart from fundamental agreement with the Freudian insight into human behavior.
The history of jurisprudence to date, in most of the world at any
"5 Nice-Matin, July i,

1972, at 22, col. 6 (Cannes-Grasse ed.).
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rate, has been that of repression, violence, and denial of human
possibilities. Against that tradition Ehrenzweig rightly inveighs,
though not so strongly as I would have done. And, by the same
token, my disagreement with his psychoanalytic jurisprudence
is that he does not carry his (and Freud's) innovative, indeed
revolutionary, findings as far as the evidence and need warrant.
Freud recognized that individual self-understanding is only
one part of mental health. 6 One can progress far, but not all the
way, toward an integration of one's personality by becoming
conscious of the drives which arise in infancy and are repressed
in the family setting. Superimposed upon the family, the form
of which is determined by the social structure of taboos and
legally-enforced prohibitions, is a rigorous set of laws and rules,
and of economic and social conditions, which each of us confronts
upon emerging from the protective family environment. Freud
recognized, and the more radical of contemporary analysts convincingly demonstrate, that the social order of the West, and the
family structure which it assiduously cultivates to protect itself
from disintegration, is the most important cause of individual
repression and unhappiness.

17

Marcuse, for example, in Eros and Civilization perceives in
Freud's writing a recognition of the limits upon individual therapeutic "cures." To cure the patient means to help him or her
see the repressive nature of both the family and the larger society. There are those wealthy enough or fortunate enough
to create zones of freedom and love within which to be integrated
human beings. But for the rest, obtaining a psychoanalytic insight leads either to resignation or to rebellion, the latter after

"oSee generally H. MARCUSE, EROS
17

A> CIVILIZATION (1955).

See, e.g., LAmro io-ii:

The relevance of Freud to our time is largely his insight, to a very considerable extent, his demonstration that the ordinary person is a shriveled,
dessicated fragment of what a person can be.
What we call "normal" is a product of repression, denial, splitting, projection, introjection, and other forms of destructive action on experience.
•.. It is radically estranged from the structure of being.
From these initial thoughts, Laing goes on to analyze the violence done to children
and adults in the family, in the systems of education, and in the larger society,
pre-figuring and patterning the violence we each do to ourselves:
In the last fifty years, we human beings have slaughtered by our own
hands coming on for one hundred million of our species. We all live under
constant threat of our total annihilation. We seem to seek death and destruction as much as life and happiness. We are as driven to kill and be
killed as we are to let live and live. Only by the most outrageous violation
of ourstlves have we achieved our capacity to live in relative adjustment
to a civilization apparently driven to its own destruction.

Id. at 49.
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recognition that human liberation is possible only in a liberated
society. As.Erich Fromm has written:"8
The fulfillment of this claim [for happiness] requires the availability of the material means for its satisfaction and must therefore entail the explosion of the prevailing social order.
One ought to add that the creation of material conditions for
human happiness is not the only necessary task. Human beings
must also create social institutions of production and life which
affirm human values.
I review all this not to suggest that Ehrenzweig should have
issued an unqualified call for revolution: within revolutionary
movements one finds also a lack of regard for the possibilities of
human love and of an end to alienation. And, certainly, Ehrenzweig goes farther than those whom Marcuse terms "the revisionist" neo-Freudians, for whom individual "adjustment" is all and
social change of next to no concern. Given the valuable and
thoughtful contribution of Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence, one
wishes that Ehrenzweig would confront and evaluate the writings
of R. D. Laing and his associates and deal directly with Marcuse's
Eros and Civilization. In both Laing and Marcuse one finds
critical insights - though from very different perspectives - into the social malaise from which springs mental illness.
Certainly, as Ehrenzweig argues, we must begin to change our
law now, in this society. But, having the insights of Freud and
those who understand his work, we must also discover in each
of us the possibilities of loving, trusting, and, finally, uniting to
make a society in which love and trust are basic goals. To unite
in this way, which many are now attempting, may bring conflict
with law. The decision to risk law-violation involves not only
deep-seated urges formed during the oedipal period, but also conscious choice of the kind which is amenable, as Ehrenzweig
argues, to the deterrent processes of the criminal law. One can
apply the criminal law, that is, to repress political behavior, and
do so effectively -as
recent American experience demonstrates.
There is, however, a limit to the effectiveness of such legal repression, and the growing strength of movements for human
liberation attests to the depth of human needs to be free.
In short, I am persuaded by Ehrenzweig's analysis and by
his basic thesis that Freudian insights can point jurisprudential
study in directions more responsive to human needs. But I believe that the present social system in the West will not permit
enough change in basic social arrangements to make psycho' 8 Fromm, Die Soziaipsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterechstheorie, 3 ZEITscuRirR
r0ti SOZIALFORSCHuNG 196, 215, quoted in MARcUSE, supra note x6, at 222.
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analytic jurisprudence an instrument of human happiness for
those subject to the law's ever-present threat of repression and
violence. We are not yet arrived at a stage of society in which
programmatic reform is enough. 9 Where Ehrenzweig writes that
the common law will not survive unless it changes in this or that
way, I would write that it will not, can not, survive because the
present legal system, and the system of social relations in whose
service it is, cannot change to permit human beings to live and
love. For now, therefore, the task is to understand the provenance of and interests reflected in currently accepted legal ideas,
and to develop a theory of law which arraigns those ideas in light
of human needs. But this "jurisprudence of insurgency" must
understand what Ehrenzweig has written and, more, must know
that his insights are crucial to its own development.
Within the group which struggles to make, in Fromm's terms,
the "explosion of the prevailing social order," there can be genuine relations of love and trust. In a society which sets a goal of
human freedom, such relations may be fostered, developed, and
encouraged, even through - perhaps especially through - the
means of "justice" chosen to enforce rules. In Laing's words: 20
[E]ach emotion is always found in one or another inflection
according to the group mode it occurs in. There are no "basic"
emotions, instincts or personality, outside of the relationships a
person has within one or another social context.
And there is no freedom, no love, and no liberation except in a
society which struggles to create the social conditions, the economic conditions, and the jurisprudence of freedom, love, and
liberation.
1" Having stated this difference with Ehrenzweig, I quickly add that even in

a society in which wealth and power are shared more nearly equally than in ours
at present, human liberation in the sense Freud perceived it does not automatically
follow. See p. 794 supra.
20 LAING 67.

